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EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: RELAXING THE
STANDARD FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS UNDER THE
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE ACT
Brad Westmoreland
Abstract: In Walston v. Boeing, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a standard used
to determine whether a worker injured by his employer’s deliberate intent to expose him to
toxic materials could pursue remedies outside of the state’s workers’ compensation system.
The Birklid standard—which requires claimants seeking remedies under the “deliberate
intention” exception to show that an employer willfully disregarded actual knowledge that an
injury was certain to occur—effectively prevents toxic exposure claimants from surviving
motions for summary judgment. This result runs in strict contravention of the Legislature’s
purpose in enacting both the deliberate intention exception and the Industrial Insurance Act.
Workers who contract diseases as a result of being exposed to toxic substances by the
deliberate intent of employers should be afforded the same remedial relief offered to workers
injured by more immediately-felt intentional acts. To accomplish this, the Supreme Court of
Washington should reconsider the high burden it places on claimants seeking remedies under
the deliberate intention exception. By altering the Birklid standard to allow for a lower degree
of certainty that an employer’s actions will result in injury, Washington courts can help ensure
that any injury produced by the deliberate intent of an employer is fairly compensated.

INTRODUCTION
Gary Walston began working at The Boeing Company (Boeing) as a
hammer shop employee in 1956.1 Over the course of his thirty-eight year
career, Walston worked with and around asbestos-containing products on
numerous occasions.2 In 1985, Boeing directed maintenance workers to
repair pipe insulation located above the hammer shop where Walston
worked.3 Because the pipe insulation contained asbestos fibers, the
maintenance workers wore protective clothing known as “moon suits” and
used ventilators for breathing.4 Soon after repairs began, Walston and
other workers in the hammer shop noticed visible dust and debris falling
from the overhead work.5 Concerned for their health, the hammer shop

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wash. 2d 391, 394, 334 P.3d 519, 520 (2014).
Id. at 391, 334 P.3d at 520–21.
Id. at 391, 334 P.3d at 520.
Id.
See id.
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employees asked the shop supervisor to allow them to perform their work
in another location, away from the falling debris.6 The supervisor denied
their request, suggesting they work in areas not directly beneath the
overhead repairs.7 Walston and the others worked in the hammer shop
without protective clothing or ventilators for close to a month.8
In 2010, Walston was diagnosed with mesothelioma,9 a rare form of
cancer generally associated with exposure to airborne asbestos particles.10
Walston sued Boeing under the deliberate intention exception11 of
Washington’s Industrial Insurance Act, claiming that Boeing had
intentionally exposed him and the other hammer shop workers to a
substance it knew to be dangerous.12 The exception, if applicable, would
allow Walston to pursue common law tort remedies against his employer
in addition to existing workers’ compensation claims. 13 Boeing moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Walston was limited to recovery under
the Industrial Insurance Act because the company did not have actual
knowledge that Walston was certain to be injured by the exposure to
asbestos.14 The trial court denied Boeing’s motion.15 The court of appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that Walston had failed to raise a material
question of fact as to whether Boeing had “actual knowledge” that the
falling asbestos was certain to cause his injury.16
In July of 2013—three months after Walston had died of his illness17—
the Supreme Court of Washington granted review of the lower court’s
decision.18 In a 5–4 split, the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed.19 In
its opinion, the majority relied on Birklid v. Boeing Co.,20 a prior decision
addressing the deliberate intention exception in instances of toxic

6. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 409, 334 P.3d at 528 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 394, 334 P.3d at 520.
10. Malignant
Mesothelioma–Patient
Version,
NAT’L
CANCER
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/mesothelioma [https://perma.cc/2FPC-HTZQ].
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.020 (2015).
12. Walston, 181 Wash. 2d at 395, 334 P.3d at 521.
13. § 51.24.020.
14. Walston, 181 Wash. 2d at 395, 334 P.3d at 521.
15. Id.
16. Walston v. Boeing Co., 173 Wash. App. 271, 288, 294 P.3d 759, 768 (2013).
17. Walston, 181 Wash. 2d at 394, 334 P.3d at 520–21.
18. Walston v. Boeing Co., 177 Wash. 2d 1019, 304 P.3d 115 (2013) (granting review).
19. Walston, 181 Wash. 2d at 393, 334 P.3d at 519.
20. 127 Wash. 2d 853, 904 P.2d 278 (1995).
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exposure. In that case, the Supreme Court of Washington determined that
the deliberate intention exception is triggered when “the employer had
actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully
disregarded that knowledge.”21 Applying the Birklid test to Walston’s
case, the Supreme Court of Washington held that exposing an employee
to a risk of disease was not sufficient to meet the deliberate intention
exception.22 Because Walston could not show that Boeing knew with
certainty that exposing workers in the hammer shop to a month-long
deluge of asbestos fibers would result in his disease, the Court held that
Boeing’s motion for summary judgment was improperly denied.23
This Comment argues that the Birklid standard creates an unjust
windfall for employers who intentionally expose their workers to
dangerous toxins in the workplace. Because toxic exposure diseases
present issues that are distinguishable from more traditional injuries
contemplated by the workers’ compensation system, the Supreme Court
of Washington should rework the standard to ensure that all employees
injured by the deliberate acts of their employers, regardless of the type of
compensable injury, are fairly compensated in light of the purpose of
modern workers’ compensation law. Part I of this Comment will address
the history and purpose of Washington’s workers’ compensation statute,
the Industrial Insurance Act, including a more detailed summary of the
deliberate intention exception. Part II will provide a summary of the
rationale the Birklid Court used in fashioning the deliberate intention
standard. Part III will describe the problems inherent in the Birklid
standard as applied to cases of deliberate toxic exposures that result in
diseases. Part IV will argue that the Supreme Court of Washington should
relax the Birklid standard in order to better account for toxic exposures
and the diseases they produce.
I.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

The development of workers’ compensation in the United States
largely begins with the second Industrial Revolution. Taking advantage of
the unprecedented expansion of transportation and communications
infrastructure throughout the country during the mid-nineteenth century,
businesses and entrepreneurs looked to distribute ever-increasing volumes
of goods into the hands of previously unreachable consumers.24 The
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 865, 904 P.2d at 285 (emphasis added).
Walston, 181 Wash. 2d at 397, 334 P.3d at 522.
Id.
JAMES S. OLSON & SHANNON L. KENNY, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: KEY THEMES AND
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burgeoning of a truly national marketplace created a need for new and
more efficient methods of production.25 The Bessemer process paved the
way for the cheap fabrication of steel; sewing and Bonsack machines
reinvigorated the textile and tobacco industries, respectively.26 New
chemical processes increased the availability of aluminum, reduced the
price of fertilizer, and lowered the cost of sugar production.27 Along with
the development and implementation of mass production techniques,
technological improvements across the gamut of industries allowed
capitalists to take advantage of the new national economy.28
But these advances were not without cost. Industrializing economies
across the globe experienced a surge of accident rates as new industries
and more powerful machinery were developed.29 America was no
exception, as the percentage of deaths attributable to accidents among
men in America rose from 7 percent in 1850 to 12 percent in 1880, a 70
percent increase.30 Nearly one-third of these accidents occurred in the
workplace,31 where human laborers contended and toiled with
compassionless metal counterparts.32 Industrialization had brought with it
an “army of injured and dying, with constantly swelling ranks marching
with halting step and dimming eyes to the great hereafter.”33 With carnage
on the rise and showing no signs of slowing, the participants of industry
struggled to find an agreeable remedy for those that bore the costs.

DOCUMENTS 67 (2015).
25. Id.
26. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control
Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 834–35 (1993).
27. Id.
28. See OLSON & KENNY, supra note 24, at 126.
29. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 22 (2004).
30. Id. at 26.
31. See id. at 27 (“Indeed, accidents were the leading cause of death among workers in hazardous
industries as diverse as railroads, mining, metal work, rubber work, shipping and canals, quarries,
telegraph and telephones, electric lighting, brick- and tile-making, and terra cotta work. In 1890,
railroad worker death rates were 314 per 100,000 per year. In that same year, coal miner fatality rates
were comparable, ranging from 215 deaths per 100,000 workers per year in bituminous coal mines to
300 deaths per 100,000 workers per year in anthracite coal mines. . . . Moreover, American wage
earners were highly concentrated in some of the most dangerous trades; in 1890, railroad and mine
workers alone represented more than one in twenty American wage earners.”).
32. See id. (“In Massachusetts, for example, 63 percent of injuries in textile factories were caused
by elevators or moving machinery. . . . Women factory operatives were also subject to the risk of
horrific injuries to their scalps by having their hair caught in power-operated shafts.”).
33. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 215 (Wis. 1911).
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The Inadequacies of the Common Law

Prior to the no-fault system of workers’ compensation, workers injured
on the job were limited to pursuing claims against their employers via the
common law tort system.34 Generally, this required proof of employer
negligence as the cause of an employee’s on-the-job injuries.35 This
system presented a number of significant obstacles for injured claimants.
The first of these was that injured workers often struggled to find
testimonial support from among their ranks, as many employees were
reluctant to testify on behalf of an injured colleague for fear of retaliatory
actions by the employer.36 Second, workers displaced by their injuries
encountered tremendous financial pressures to quickly settle claims
against their employers in order to avoid becoming destitute.37
Understandably, the weight of those external pressures increased where
the injured employee served as the principal breadwinner of a family
unit.38 Third, employers were often able to succeed against employeeinitiated suits by claiming any of a number of common defenses.39 Fourth,
exorbitant court costs, delays, and contingency fees significantly reduced
the amount of a plaintiff’s actual compensation.40 The ultimate result was
a faulty compensatory system that “[gave] a stone to one who asks for
bread.”41
B.

The Great Compromise

In response to the pitfalls of the common law tort system—as well as
the uncertainty employers faced when state courts began to check
employers’ use of common law defenses to negligence in the beginning

34. George H. Singer, Workers’ Compensation: The Assault on the Shield of Immunity—Coming
to Blows with the Exclusive-Remedy Provisions of the North Dakota Workers’ Compensation Act, 70
N.D. L. REV. 905, 907–08 (1994).
35. Id. at 908–09.
36. Id. at 909.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Darin Calbreath Davidson, Comment, Expansion of the ‘Deliberate Intention’ Exception to
Washington’s Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity: Following Birklid v. Boeing Co., When Does an
Employer Intend Employee Injury?, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 225, 228 (1996) (“In order to receive
compensation for workplace injuries, employees had to overcome the ‘unholy trinity’ of contributory
negligence, assumption of the risk, and the ‘fellow servant’ rule. Employers could generally escape
liability by employing one or more of these defenses.”).
40. Singer, supra note 34, at 909.
41. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 215 (Wis. 1911).
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of the twentieth century42—the Washington State Legislature enacted the
Industrial Insurance Act (IIA) in 1911. Functionally, the IIA instituted two
important changes. First, most civil actions by employees hurt on the job
were eliminated and replaced by an administrative proceeding.43 Second,
fault would no longer be considered in determining liability for injuries in
the workplace.44 The first of these changes benefited employers by
eliminating the uncertainties that accompanied civil defense of injury and
death claims before sympathetic juries.45 The second change benefited
workers by eliminating the legal hurdles inherent in the common law
approach, thus providing quicker and surer relief in the wake of workplace
injuries.46 The “quid pro quo” nature of this arrangement between workers
and employers, each giving up something in exchange for something else,
led to its lofty designation as the “great compromise.” 47
Although the Act provided benefits to both employees and employers,
its language prioritizes remedial relief for the injured worker:
The common law system governing the remedy of workers
against employers for injuries received in employment is
inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. In practice it
proves to be economically unwise and unfair. Its administration
has produced the result that little of the cost of the employer has
reached the worker and that little only at large expense to the
public. The remedy of the worker has been uncertain, slow and
inadequate. Injuries in such works, formerly occasional, have
become frequent and inevitable. The welfare of the state depends
upon its industries, and even more upon the welfare of the wage
worker.48
The legislature finds that Washington state’s workers’
compensation system should be designed to focus on achieving
the best outcomes for injured workers.49
Over the years, Washington courts have continuously recognized this

42. See, e.g., Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation
in the United States, 1900–1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305 (1998); Green v. W. Am. Co., 30 Wash. 87, 70
P. 310 (1902) (narrowing the assumption-of-risk defense).
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (2015).
44. Id.
45. See Davidson, supra note 39, at 229.
46. § 51.04.010.
47. Stertz v. Indus. Ins. Comm’n of Washington, 91 Wash. 588, 590, 158 P. 256, 258 (1916).
48. § 51.04.010.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.062 (2015).
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central purpose.50
C.

The Deliberate Intention Exception

A crucial aspect of the IIA—and of any workers’ compensation
system—is the exclusivity provision, which precludes the availability of
state tort claims against employers for compensable on-the-job injuries.51
But this prohibition is not absolute. A worker with injuries resulting from
the “deliberate intention” of his or her employer has a cause of action
outside the IIA’s limited compensation provisions:
If injury results to a worker from the deliberate intention of his or
her employer to produce such injury, the worker or beneficiary of
the worker shall have the privilege to take under this title and also
have cause of action against the employer as if this title had not
been enacted, for any damages in excess of compensation and
benefits paid or payable under this title.52
The purpose of enacting this provision was two-fold. First, the provision
was meant to deter the intentional wrongdoings of employers against
employees.53 Second, the provision was designed to ensure that employers
did not bear the risks associated with the intentional wrongdoings of other
employers.54 As a general matter, the “non-accidental” nature of
intentional-tort injuries committed by employers against employees made
their occurrences discordant with the “accidental” roots of modern
workers’ compensation systems. 55At the center of the exclusivity
provision—and at issue in the Walston case—is the meaning of the phrase
“deliberate intention.”
50. See, e.g., Dennis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash. 2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295, 1297
(1987) (“[T]he guiding principle in construing provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act is that the
Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing
compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of
the worker.”); Favor v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 53 Wash. 2d 698, 703, 336 P.2d 382, 385 (1959)
(“[Workers’ compensation] was intended to provide, at the expense of the industry employing them,
a sure and speedy relief for workmen (or their dependents) where disability or death resulted from
injuries sustained in the course of their employment . . . .”); Montoya v. Greenway Aluminum Co.,
Inc., 10 Wash. App. 630, 634, 519 P.2d 22, 25 (1974) (“The Industrial Insurance Act is intended to
grant the employee a sure and certain relief while imposing liability upon the accident found
regardless of the fault or due care of either the employer or the employee.”).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010; see also Sharpe v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 F.3d 1045, 1051
(9th Cir. 1995).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.020 (2015).
53. Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash. 2d 853, 873, 904 P.2d 278, 289 (1995).
54. Id.
55. Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers’ Compensation Statutes,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1650–51 (1983).
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THE BIRKLID STANDARD

The ultimate test for determining whether a claimant satisfies the
deliberate intention exception was fashioned in Birklid v. Boeing Co.56 In
that case, Boeing had begun to use a new material in certain interior parts
of its airplanes in response to heightened Federal Aviation Administration
regulations on flammability.57 The material consisted of woven fiberglass
cloth infused with phenol-formaldehyde resin.58 As preproduction testing
began, one of Boeing’s general supervisors noted that the noxious odors
of the material caused employees to complain of “dizziness, dryness in
nose and throat, burning eyes, and upset stomach.”59 Anticipating that
these symptoms would increase with greater production and higher
temperatures, the supervisor requested improved ventilation in the
facility.60 Boeing management denied the request, citing economic
considerations.61 Predictably, workers experienced the previously
complained-of symptoms once full production began.62
On certification from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
the Supreme Court of Washington was tasked with identifying the
standard for deliberate intention under the IIA.63 The Court began by
noting that the following policies inherent in the exception should be
given effect: 1) remedies for employees deliberately injured by employers
should not be limited to the IIA; and 2) employers engaged in such
conduct should not be allowed to burden and compromise the industrial
insurance risk pool.64 Rejecting Boeing’s proposed interpretation of RCW
51.24.020, the Court provided a summary of how courts in Washington
and elsewhere had dealt with the deliberate intention exception up to that
point.
A.

Deliberate Intention in Washington

The Birklid Court began its discussion of Washington’s treatment of
the deliberate intention exception with Delthony v. Standard Furniture

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

127 Wash. 2d 853, 904 P.2d 278 (1995).
Id. at 856, 904 P.2d at 281.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 858–59, 904 P.2d at 282.
Id. at 859, 904 P.2d at 282–83.
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Co.,65 a 1922 dispute involving an exploding boiler. In that case, the
plaintiff-worker sought compensation beyond what he had already
received under the IIA “on the ground that the employer deliberately
intended to injure him by allowing a dangerous condition to exist.” 66 The
Delthony court rejected the claim, reasoning that negligence on the part of
the employer did not tend to prove deliberate intent.67
Subsequent Washington cases reinforced the Delthony requirement for
specific intent. In Higley v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,68 a worker sued his
employer after he was injured while operating a saw with a Plexiglass
protective shield.69 Higley claimed that the employer’s use of flimsy
Plexiglass shields as a protective measure against the frequent breaking
and flying of cutterheads was so negligent that it should be considered an
intentional act.70 The court rejected this argument, holding that a
substantial certainty that an act would produce injury was insufficient to
show deliberate intention.71
Foster v. Allsop Automatic, Inc.72 further defined the parameters of the
intent required. In that case, Foster’s supervisors had allowed workers to
disable the safety device on a 90-ton hydraulic punch press.73 Foster was
injured when the press struck one of his hands as he operated it—an
occurrence that would have been impossible had the safety device been
engaged.74 Foster claimed that the circumvention of the safety device and
the resulting injury to his hand were brought about by the deliberate intent
of his employer.75 Though the Court conceded that the employer may have
intended that its workers operate a dangerous machine without a safety
device, the Court concluded that the required intention under the
deliberate intention exception “relates to the injury, not the act causing the
injury.”76
Prior to the Birklid decision, only one case contesting the existence of

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

119 Wash. 298, 205 P. 379 (1922).
Birklid, 127 Wash. 2d at 859, 904 P.2d at 283.
Delthony, 119 Wash. at 300, 205 P. at 379–80.
13 Wash. App. 269, 534 P.2d 596 (1975).
Higley, 13 Wash. App. at 270, 534 P.2d at 596.
Id.
Id. at 270–71, 534 P.2d at 596–97.
86 Wash. 2d 579, 547 P.2d 856 (1976).
Id. at 580, 547 P.2d at 857.
Id.
Id. at 581, 547 P.2d at 857.
Id. at 584, 547 P.2d at 859.
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deliberate intention sided with the plaintiff-worker.77 Events giving rise to
the injury in Perry v. Beverage78 began when Beverage, the foreman of a
logging camp, got into an argument with a buck sawyer named Perry.79
As the argument escalated, Beverage swung a ceramic pitcher and struck
Perry in the face, causing significant damage.80 Perry sued Beverage for
compensation outside the industrial insurance fund.81 The Court
ultimately affirmed the judgment against the foreman, concluding “the
jury had a right to find that there was a deliberate intention on the part of
Beverage to do injury.”82
Following its summary of the law, the Birklid Court opined that prior
jurisprudence had read the exception to the exclusivity provision of the
IIA “nearly out of existence.”83 The Court reasoned that the legislature
could not have intended the perimeters of the exception to begin and end
with assault and battery by the employer on the employee, as was the case
in Perry.84 Although the Perry assault had been the only successfully
contested case involving the exception, the statutory words of RCW
51.24.020 must provide for “something more.”85 Taking advantage of the
case before it, the Birklid Court set out to more clearly define the meaning
of the statute.86
B.

Deliberate Intention Elsewhere

In fashioning a new test for the deliberate intention exception, the
Birklid Court considered how other jurisdictions had approached the
subject. It first looked at the “substantial certainty” test adopted by a
number of states.87 Michigan had adopted the standard nearly ten years
prior in Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co.88 In that case, a research
chemist at Dow Chemical was injured after being exposed to Agent

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash. 2d 853, 861, 904 P.2d 278, 283 (1995).
121 Wash. 652, 209 P. 1102 (1922).
Id. at 654–55, 904 P. at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 659, 904 P.2d at 1105.
Id.
Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash. 2d 853, 862, 904 P.2d 278, 284 (1995).
Id. at 862–63, 904 P.2d at 284.
Id. at 863, 904 P.2d at 284.
Id.
Id. at 864, 904 P.2d at 284–85.
398 N.W.2d 882 (Mich. 1986).
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Orange,89 a compound containing the toxic substance dioxin.90
Beauchamp claimed that Dow Chemical had intentionally assaulted him
by exposing him to a chemical they knew to be dangerous.91 Recognizing
that the legislative intent of the state’s workers’ compensation system was
to provide an alternative means of compensating accidental injuries,92 the
Beauchamp Court concluded that Michigan’s workers’ compensation
statute did not prevent workers from bringing intentional tort claims
against employers.93 But in order to address the injured chemist’s claims,
the appropriate definition of “intentional” would need to be determined. 94
The Beauchamp Court considered the pros and cons of two definitions
of “intentional” that were prevalent at the time: the true intentional tort
standard and the substantial certainty test.95 The true intentional tort
standard limited recovery to instances where the employer “truly intended
the injury as well as the act.”96 This was the standard the Michigan Court
of Appeals had applied to Beauchamp’s claims at the lower level.97 The
Supreme Court of Michigan expressed a number of reservations with the
true intentional tort test, including the fear that it might allow employers
“to injure and even kill employees and suffer only workers’ compensation
damages so long as the employer did not specifically intend to hurt the
worker.”98 Furthermore, the Court recognized that a lack of remedial
compensation for the intentionally injured worker would create perverse
incentives for employers primarily concerned with the bottom line.99 If
the costs of accidental injury were to be borne by industrial members of

89. Id. at 883.
90. See Nehmer v. Veterans’ Admin. of the Gov’t of the U.S., 284 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“Agent Orange is a chemical defoliant used by the United States Armed Forces in Vietnam to clear
dense jungle land during the war. It contains the toxic substance dioxin. Since its use, Agent Orange
has been statistically linked with the occurrence of many diseases in those exposed, including prostate
cancer.”).
91. Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 833.
92. Id. at 887.
93. Id. at 889.
94. Id. at 891.
95. Id. at 887–93.
96. Id. at 891.
97. Id. at 891.
98. Id. at 893.
99. Id. (quoting Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., 433 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ohio 1982)
(Celebrezze, J., concurring) (“The bottom line in this case is that prohibiting an employee from suing
his or her employer for intentional tortious injury would allow a corporation to ‘cost-out’ an
investment decision to kill workers. This abdication of employer responsibility . . . is an affront to the
dignity of every single working man and working woman in Ohio.”)).
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the workers’ compensation system,100 the true intentional tort standard
could allow an employer wishing to intentionally injure his workers “to
shift his liability to a fund paid for with premiums collected from innocent
employers.”101
The Beauchamp Court then considered the substantial certainty test as
a means of defining the exclusivity provision.102 Under that test,
intentional torts are not “limited to consequences which are desired. If the
actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to
result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he
had in fact desired to produce the result.”103 Although it ultimately
adopted this standard,104 the Beauchamp Court recognized that the
concepts of substantial certainty and substantial risk could be a source of
confusion.105 Courts could, and frequently did,106 blur the lines that
separated intentional, reckless, and negligent conduct.107 In order to avoid
misapplication of the standard, the Court gave examples of instances
where employer conduct implicated a substantial certainty of injury.108 On
balance, the Beauchamp Court concluded that the benefits and protections
offered by a properly applied substantial certainty test outweighed the
clearer definition of “intentional” provided by the true intentional tort
standard.109
In addition to the standards discussed by the Beauchamp Court, the
Birklid Court briefly considered Oregon’s approach to defining
100. Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., 153 N.W. 49, 51–52 (Mich. 1915).
101. Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 889 (quoting Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 408 N.E.2d 198,
203 (Ill. 1980)).
102. Id. at 893.
103. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 482 (La. 1981); see also Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 892
(“If the injury is substantially certain to occur as a consequence of actions the employer intended, the
employer is deemed to have intended the injuries as well.”).
104. Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 893.
105. Bradfield v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 477 N.E.2d 621, 621–22 (Ohio 1985) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
106. See, e.g., id.; Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1047 (Ohio 1984) (extending
substantial certainty test to cover substantial likelihood of injury); Bradfield v. Stop-N-Go Foods,
Inc., 477 N.E.2d 621, 621–22 (Ohio 1985) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Nayman v. Kilbane, 439 N.E.2d
888, 890–91 (Ohio 1982) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
107. Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 893.
108. Id. at 23–25 (quoting Serna v. Statewide Contractors, 429 P.2d 504, 505–06 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1967)) (“Two men were killed when a ditch caved in and buried them alive. In the five months
preceding the disaster, inspectors had warned that ‘the sides of the ditch were not sloped properly, the
side was sandy, more shoring was needed, and escape ladders should be placed every 25 feet.’ During
that time a cave-in had occurred, burying one of the decedents up to his waist. All warnings were
ignored.”).
109. See Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 893.
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“deliberate intent.”110 In Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc.,111 a painter
sued his employer for failing to provide a supplied-air respirator in poorly
ventilated painting booths.112 Many of the paints the employer used on its
products contained isocyanates,113 compounds with various negative
health effects.114 After experiencing headaches, dizziness, memory loss,
and nausea, the painter asked his employer to supply the required
respirator.115 The employer did not bring in a supplied-air system until
some months later, and only then for a limited time because he did not
wish to buy the unit.116 The plaintiff’s condition continued to worsen until
his physician advised him to quit.117 By the time he left his job, the painter
had become so sensitive to hydrocarbons that he was permanently
disabled from working as a painter.118
The Lusk Court’s approach to defining the meaning of “deliberate
intent” was more nuanced than that of the Beauchamp Court. Like
Washington’s treatment of intent in Foster, the Court found that deliberate
intent refers to specific intent to cause an injury.119 The Court went on to
stipulate, however, that the intent to cause injury must apply “to someone,
although not necessarily to the particular employe[e] that was injured.”120
The Court seemed to add another wrinkle to the deliberate intention
exception by giving meaning to the term “deliberate.” 121 In addition to
showing that an employer had “intent to injure,” the standard required a
showing that the employer “had an opportunity to weigh the consequences
and to make a conscious choice among possible courses of action.” 122

110. Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash. 2d 853, 865, 904 P.2d 278, 285 (1995).
111. 775 P.2d 891 (Or. 1989).
112. Id. at 892.
113. Id.
114. See Safety and Health Topics: Isocyanates, OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/isocyanates/
[https://perma.cc/Q23Z-8J3U] (“Health effects of isocyanate exposure include irritation of skin and
mucous membranes, chest tightness, and difficult breathing. Isocyanates include compounds
classified as potential human carcinogens and known to cause cancer in animals. The main effects of
hazardous exposures are occupational asthma and other lung problems, as well as irritation of the
eyes, nose, throat, and skin.”).
115. Lusk, 775 P.2d at 892.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 894.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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The Decision

Ultimately, the Birklid Court rejected both the substantial certainty test
adopted by Michigan in Beauchamp and Oregon’s conscious weighing
test.123 The Court reasoned that Washington’s historically narrow
interpretation of the exclusivity provision—especially its outright
rejection of the substantial certainty test in Higley—required as much.124
Furthermore, the Court was hesitant to undo what it perceived to be the
generational work of preserving the “grand compromise” embodied in the
IIA.125 Instead, the Court fashioned its own definition, holding that
deliberate intention “means the employer had actual knowledge that an
injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.” 126
Because Boeing “knew in advance its workers would become ill from the
phenol-formaldehyde fumes, yet put the new resin into production” and
“observed its workers becoming ill from the exposure,” a trier of fact
could find deliberate intention.127
Unfortunately, the facts in Birklid are distinguishable from facts one
might generally expect in an intentional toxic exposure claim. The
plaintiffs in Birklid had the “advantage” of suffering from symptoms
immediately upon being exposed to the harmful substance.128 Would the
result have been the same had the plaintiffs, some years after being
exposed to the chemicals and never having shown immediate symptoms
of toxic exposure, brought a claim under the deliberate intention
exception? Walston clearly answers that question in the negative.129
III. THE BIRKLID WINDFALL
The application of the Birklid standard to cases like Gary Walston’s—
where an employee claims that a disease was the result of intentional
exposure to toxic substances by his employer—undermines the purpose
of the deliberate intention exception by making it nearly impossible for
claimants like Walston to obtain just relief for their injuries. This, by
extension, undermines the IIA. Notwithstanding Washington courts’
consistent treatment of the exception as a “narrowly interpreted”

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash. 2d 853, 865, 904 P.2d 278, 285 (1995).
Id. at 865–66, 904 P.2d at 285.
Id. at 859, 873–74, 904 P.2d at 282, 289–90.
Id. at 865, 904 P.2d at 285.
Id. at 863–65, 904 P. 2d at 284–85.
Id. at 856, 904 P.2d at 281.
Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wash. 2d 391, 334 P.3d 519 (2014).
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provision,130 the Birklid standard provides a windfall for employers that
deliberately expose workers to chemicals and substances they know to be
harmful. To better understand the trouble Washington courts have had in
constructing an equitable approach to the deliberate intention exception,
it is helpful to examine the IIA’s legislative framework.
A.

Injury and Disease: Unique Concepts with a (Supposedly)
Common Remedy

Injuries have always been at the center of workers’ compensation
systems.131 The IIA—like workers’ compensation statutes in other
states—sought to address the ascending rate of traumatic, physical injuries
in the workplace as industrialization swept America.132 The Legislature’s
conceptualization of “injury” at the time of the IIA’s ratification is
apparent from the definition it supplied for that term in Title 51: “‘Injury’
means a sudden and tangible happening, of a traumatic nature, producing
an immediate or prompt result, and occurring from without, and such
physical conditions as result therefrom.” 133 This definition is consistent
with the “traditional” injuries one might expect to be endured by workers
in the latter half of the nineteenth century—broken bones, amputations,
burns or paralysis caused by interactions with machinery, proximity to
industrial explosions, or burial in a collapsed coal mine.134
The IIA’s original iteration did not include compensatory coverage for
diseases incurred in the workplace—the addition of occupational diseases
to the workers’ compensation scheme did not occur until 1937.135 If this
fact alone were not enough to establish the vast difference between
“injury” and “disease” contemplated by the IIA, the Supreme Court of
Washington clarified the point shortly after occupational diseases were
added to the state’s workers’ compensation system:
It will be noted that the legislature in the original act used the
word “injury” and defined it, while in the occupational disease act
it used the word “disability” but gave it no definition. It is obvious
from the proceedings of the legislature that in passing the last act

130. See, e.g., Howland v. Grout, 123 Wash. App. 6, 10, 94 P.3d 332, 334 (2004); Byrd v. Sys.
Transp., Inc., 124 Wash. App. 196, 202, 99 P.3d 394, 397 (2004).
131. See supra Part I.
132. See id.
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (1961).
134. See supra Part I.
135. Dennis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash. 2d 467, 472–73, 745 P.2d 1295, 1298–99
(1987).
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it had in mind that a different ruling should apply to those
suffering from occupational disease when the word disability was
used, otherwise the word injury, already defined, would have
been employed. . . . The difference between the meaning of the
words is more apparent when we consider the distinct difference
between traumatic injury and occupational disease. The former is
one of notoriety, a happening which can be fixed at a point in
time, while the latter . . . has a slow and insidious approach and
in many cases does not manifest itself until after the lapse of a
considerable length of time.136
Although the addition of occupational diseases in 1937 created
harmony in the IIA’s treatment of compensable injuries for employees
that suffered from legitimate accidents or illnesses,137 the convergence of
triggering words has had detrimental effects in cases where workers allege
that their injuries were the result of an employer’s deliberate intent. The
interplay of terms found in the IIA’s boilerplate definition of “injury,” the
deliberate intention exception provision, and the supplemental definitions
provided in Chapter 24 of the IIA create a statutory dissonance that
ultimately undermines the integrity of the intentional tort exception.
The inherent immediacy of “injury”—as defined in Chapter 8 of the
IIA—conflicts with the slow development of many diseases referred to by
the Supreme Court of Washington in Henson.138 Nowhere is this more
troubling than in the application of the deliberate intention exception.
Chapter 24 of the IIA contains both the deliberate intention exception and
a supplemental definition of “injury” to be applied to the exception. Side
by side, the provisions read as follows:
If injury results to a worker from the deliberate intention of his or
her employer to produce such injury, the worker or beneficiary of
the worker shall have the privilege to take under this title and also
have cause of action against the employer as if this title had not
been enacted, for any damages in excess of compensation and
benefits paid or payable under this title.139
For the purposes of this chapter, “injury” shall include any
physical or mental condition, disease, ailment or loss, including
death, for which compensation and benefits are paid or payable
under this title.140
Thus, in instances where the alleged intentional tort has resulted in a
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Henson v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 15 Wash. 2d 384, 390–91, 130 P.2d 885, 887–88 (1942).
Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 472–74, 745 P.2d at 1298–99.
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.110 (2015); Henson, 15 Wash. 2d at 390–91, 130 P.2d at 888.
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.020 (2015).
Id. at § 51.24.030(3) (1995) (emphasis added).
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disease, the construction of RCW 51.24.020 would read like this:
If [a disease] results to a worker from the deliberate intention of
his or her employer to produce such [disease], the worker or
beneficiary of the worker shall have the privilege to take under
this title and also have cause of action against the employer as if
this title had not been enacted, for any damages in excess of
compensation and benefits paid or payable under this title.
One problem with this construction is that it doesn’t account for the
unique place occupied by toxic exposure injuries in the landscape of tort
litigation. American courts have been struggling with problems of
causation in toxic torts since the 1970s.141 Today, the general consensus
among jurisdictions is that plaintiffs must prove general causation (a
showing that the substance in question is capable of causing the injury at
issue) and specific causation (proof by preponderance of the evidence that
the particular substance caused the specific injury).142 The burden of
proving general causation can be alleviated somewhat in instances where
the dangers of the substance in question are well documented, as is the
case with asbestos.143 But when the effects of a certain substance are less
known, or when the substance itself is relatively new, courts must lean
more heavily on epidemiological studies to determine whether the
substance is in fact capable of causing injury.144 These studies are not
always conclusive and are sometimes based on weak evidentiary
sources.145
Compared to the straightforward application of the causation element
in “traditional” injury torts, toxic exposure torts present myriad issues that
warrant a differential treatment under the deliberate intention exception.
Justice Charles Wiggins, writing for the dissent in Walston, perhaps best
summed up the problems associated with equating diseases with injuries
for purposes of the exception:
Diseases differ from traditional workplace injuries. For example,
physical injuries are often immediately visible, while diseases
have latency periods with symptoms materializing sometime after
141. David E. Bernstein, Getting to Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 51, 51
(2008).
142. Id. at 52.
143. Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wash. 2d 391, 401, 334 P.3d 519, 524 (2014) (Wiggins, J.,
dissenting).
144. Bernstein, supra note 141, at 53.
145. See id. at 61–66 (explaining the problematic nature of relying on epidemiological reports
based on “high-dose animal studies, anecdotal case reports, analogizing from known effects of
‘similar’ chemicals, preliminary epidemiological studies that have not been peer-reviewed, and
differential etiologies used to ‘rule in’ an otherwise unknown causal relationship”).
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exposure. Relatedly, there is no way to know with absolute
certainty that an exposed individual will ever contract a disease.
Moreover, most diseases are caused by multiple factors, which
can make it difficult to prove causation. . . . Most toxic exposure
injuries are dose-related, meaning the greater the exposure, the
more severe the consequences. In addition, whether an exposed
individual will suffer a compensable injury depends in part on
vulnerabilities unique to that person. These qualities make it near
impossible to predict with absolute certainty how each exposure
will affect a particular individual.146
Given the complex nature of disease development in the human body
as a result of toxic exposure, the threshold level of certainty required by
the Birklid standard shifts the ill plaintiff’s burden of proof into an
unattainable realm. Although injuries and diseases are meant to have a
common remedy under the law, current conditions do not allow for such
a result.
B.

Intent and Certainty: Straightforward Application for Injuries, Bar
to Recovery for Diseases

The inclusion of the deliberate intention exception in the IIA is a clear
indicator that accidents and intentional acts were meant to be treated
differently. The exception ensures that intentional-tort-committing
employers do not taint the risk pool of workers’ compensation, but it is
also meant to deter employers from intentionally placing their employees
in harm’s way.147 If the Legislature intended to protect workers’
compensation participants in this way, we must ask whether the Birklid
standard, as applied to diseases caused by deliberate toxic exposure, gives
effect to that intent.
The Delthony, Higley, and Foster line of cases narrowed the
application of the exception to one of specific intent.148 Delthony rejected
the notion that employer negligence could tend to prove deliberate
intent.149 Higley held that substantial certainty that an act would produce
an injury was insufficient to show deliberate intent.150 Foster made it clear
that intent, for purposes of the exception, related to the resulting injury,

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Walston, 181 Wash. 2d at 401, 334 P.2d at 524 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash. 2d 853, 873, 904 P.2d 278, 289 (1995).
See supra Part II.
Delthony v. Standard Furniture Co., 119 Wash. 298, 300, 205 P. 379, 379–80 (1922).
Higley v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 13 Wash. App. 269, 270–71, 534 P.2d 596, 598 (1975).
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not to the act that caused the injury.151 Together, these cases produced
deliberate intent jurisprudence that the Birklid Court ultimately found
unacceptable.152 The exception, that Court found, was meant to apply to
cases beyond the typical instance of assault and battery.153 It was with this
acknowledgement that the Birklid Court set out to find a standard that
would provide injured workers “something more” than the state had, to
that point, offered them.154
In defining the meaning of the statute, the Birklid Court found the facts
of the case to be illuminating.155 It focused on the requisite level of
certainty an employer must have that his actions will result in an
employee’s injury.156 What made the case distinguishable from previous
deliberate intention cases was the fact that Boeing had already exposed its
workers to the toxic substance, had seen the injurious effects it had on its
workers, and knowingly exposed them to the substance again.157 The
second exposure was no accident.158 Boeing’s actions had involved the
“willful disregard of actual knowledge” that employees would be
injured.159 Later in its opinion, the Birklid Court adopted this very same
language as the new deliberate intention standard.160
In cases involving a simple battery event such as Perry, in which an
employer physically assaulted his employee, the high level of certainty
that the employer’s actions would result in injury is fairly apparent.161
Even in circumstances like those in Birklid, in which the employer knew
that exposing employees to certain toxins would produce the same
injurious result as it had in the testing phase, the high level of certainty is
clear.162 For cases like these, where the injury is immediately apparent and
easily traceable to the actions of the employer, the Birklid standard offers
a reasonable solution. But when the compensable injury is a disease that
manifests after years of latency, removed from the easily traceable actions
of the employer, the Birklid standard falls short.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Foster v. Allsop Automatic, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 579, 584, 547 P.2d 856, 859 (1976).
Birklid, 127 Wash. 2d at 862, 904 P.2d at 284.
Id. at 862–63, 904 P.2d at 284.
Id. at 863, 904 P.2d at 284.
Id. at 862, 904 P.2d at 284.
Id. at 863–866, 904 P.2d at 284–86.
Id. at 863, 904 P.2d at 284.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 865, 904 P.2d at 286.
Perry v. Beverage, 121 Wash. 652, 659, 209 P. 1102, 1105 (1922).
Birklid, 127 Wash. 2d at 863, 864–65, 904 P.2d at 284–86.
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IV. FIXING THE SYSTEM
Current deliberate intention jurisprudence makes it nearly impossible
for plaintiffs to prove that an employer had absolute certainty that a
disease would result from its acts or omissions.163 In general terms,
accidents and occupational diseases are to be treated similarly under the
IIA.164 But the combination of the Birklid standard and the inherent
differences between immediate injuries and latent diseases means that
plaintiffs bringing claims under the deliberate intention exception will be
treated differently depending on the nature of their injuries. Since workerplaintiffs have little control over the nature of the injuries they sustain, the
Supreme Court of Washington must relax the Birklid standard to better
account for deliberate toxic exposures and the diseases they produce.
A.

Relaxing the Standard: Bringing Diseases into the Realm of
Injuries

The Birklid Court’s interpretation of RCW 51.24.020 creates an
egregiously high threshold for injured workers like Gary Walston. Justice
Wiggins, writing for the dissent in Walston, offered an alternative reading
that merits consideration:
Thus, to show “deliberate intention” under RCW 51.24.020, a
plaintiff must show that an employer knew with a high degree of
confidence that injury would result and yet willfully disregarded
that knowledge. This interpretation gives effect to the
legislature’s intent to hold an employer accountable when the
employer deliberately intends to produce a disease.165
It is worth noting that the dissent’s reading is largely based on the
presumption that diseases stemming from toxic exposure are the result of
a “specific injurious process” that begins with toxic contact. 166 The
majority expressly rejected this position, reaffirming earlier cases holding
that asymptomatic cellular-level injury merely created a risk of

163. Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wash. 2d 391, 401, 334 P.3d 519, 524 (2014) (Wiggins, J.,
dissenting).
164. Dennis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash. 2d 467, 472–74, 745 P.2d 1295, 1298–99
(1987).
165. Walston, 181 Wash. 2d at 403, 334 P.3d at 525 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 402–03, 334 P.3d at 524 (recognizing the damaging effects of asbestos upon
inhalation); id. at 404, 334 P.3d at 525 (“Here, exposure to asbestos caused immediate and certain
scarring in Walston’s lungs—under the statute, this satisfies the injury requirement once and if the
scars develop into a compensable disease.”).
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compensable injury.167 In situations where a substance inflicts immediate
and certain injury—such as pulmonary scarring in the case of asbestos—
that later develops into a compensable disease, the dissent’s standard
would allow for recovery outside the IIA if the exposure was the result of
an employer’s intentional act.168
On balance, Justice Wiggins’ proposed reading would be an
improvement to the standard currently used by the Court. By lowering the
required level of certainty, it would permit victims of intentional exposure
to seek relief outside of the accident-based workers’ compensation
regime. Plaintiffs exposed to toxins known to create a high risk of disease
would stand a much better chance of surviving summary judgment. At the
same time, it is not likely to lead to a flood of litigation because substantial
probability of injury would still be insufficient to meet the standard.169
If the Supreme Court of Washington were to take up this issue again, it
should follow the Walston dissent’s lead170 and consider the nature of the
toxic substance and the ways in which other jurisdictions have determined
when injury occurs.171
B.

A New Opportunity

Birklid v. Boeing Co. was a unanimous decision that set the course for
deliberate intention jurisprudence in Washington for the next twenty
years.172 Walston v. Boeing Co. nearly changed that course in a 5–4
decision.173 One member of the majority at the time of the Walston
decision was Judge Leach, an appellate judge serving as justice pro tem.174
Justice Yu, a recent appointment to the Supreme Court of Washington at
the time, did not participate in the decision.175 Only four members of the
Walston majority remain on the state’s highest bench.176 If a case like
Gary Walston’s were to reach the high court in its current composition, an
adjustment to the Birklid standard could be on the horizon.
167. See id. at 398, 334 P.3d at 522–23 (majority opinion).
168. Id. at 404, 334 P.3d at 535 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 408, 334 P.3d at 528.
170. Id.
171. One remaining question is how the dissent’s interpretation would apply to instances where
toxic exposure did not inflict an immediate and certain injury on the worker, but did result in a
compensable disease sometime later.
172. See id. at 393, 334 P.3d at 520 (majority opinion).
173. Id. at 391, 334 P.3d at 519.
174. Id. at 399, 334 P.3d at 523.
175. Id.
176. Justices of the Supreme Court, WASHINGTON COURTS, http://www.courts.wa.gov/
appellate_trial_courts/SupremeCourt/?fa=supremecourt.justices [https://perma.cc/25M8-8AU9].
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CONCLUSION
The IIA was instituted to provide sure and certain relief to workers
injured on the job. It represented a legislative effort to overcome the
unfortunate consequences of a working environment that was constantly
evolving. As the effects of workplace toxins become more apparent and
more costly, the caretakers of the state’s workers’ compensation system
must adapt and ensure that no class of workers is forgotten. The Birklid
standard, though sufficient when applied to instances where an
employer’s deliberate actions result in immediate harms to an employee,
insufficiently accounts for injuries resulting from deliberate toxic
exposures. In order to maintain the integrity of Washington’s workers’
compensation system for all workers, the Birklid standard must be relaxed
enough to accommodate those who suffer from slower, more insidious
injuries.

